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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 91-7849
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STEPHEN BUCKLEY, PETITIONER v. MICHAEL
FITZSIMMONS et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the seventh circuit
[June 24, 1993]

  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In an action brought under 42 U. S. C. 1983, peti-
tioner seeks damages from respondent prosecutors for al-
legedly fabricating evidence during the preliminary investi-
gation of a crime and making false statements at a press
conference announcing the return of an indictment.  The
questions presented are whether respondents are abso-
lutely immune from liability on either or both of these
claims.
  As the case comes to us, we have no occasion to consi-
der whether some or all of respondents' conduct may be
protected by qualified immunity.  Moreover, we make two
important assumptions about the case: first, that petition-
er's allegations are entirely true; and, second, that they
allege constitutional violations for which 1983 provides
a remedy.  Our statement of facts is therefore derived en-
tirely from petitioner's complaint and is limited to matters
relevant to respondents' claim to absolute immunity.

                                 I
  Petitioner commenced this action on March 4, 1988,
following his release from jail in DuPage County, Illinois.
He had been incarcerated there for three years on charges
growing out of the highly publicized murder of Jeanine
Nicarico, an 11-year-old child, on February 25, 1983.  The
complaint named 17 defendants, including DuPage County,
its Sheriff and seven of his assistants, two expert wit-
nesses and the estate of a third, and the five respondents.
  Respondent Fitzsimmons was the duly elected DuPage
County State's Attorney from the time of the Nicarico
murder through December 1984, when he was succeeded
by respondent Ryan, who had defeated him in a Republi-
can primary election on March 21, 1984.  Respondent
Knight was an assistant state's attorney under Fitz-
simmons and served as a special prosecutor in the Nica-
rico case under Ryan.  Respondents Kilander (who came
into office with Ryan) and King were assistant prosecu-
tors, also assigned to the case.
  The theory of petitioner's case is that in order to obtain
an indictment in a case that had engendered -extensive
publicity- and -intense emotions in the community,- the
prosecutors fabricated false evidence, and that in order to
gain votes, Fitzsimmons made false statements about
petitioner in a press conference announcing his arrest and
indictment 12 days before the primary election.  Petitioner
claims that respondents' misconduct created a -highly
prejudicial and inflamed atmosphere- that seriously
impaired the fairness of the judicial proceedings against
an innocent man and caused him to suffer a serious loss
of freedom, mental anguish, and humiliation.
  The fabricated evidence related to a bootprint on the
door of the Nicarico home apparently left by the killer
when he kicked in the door.  After three separate studies
by experts from the DuPage County Crime Lab, the
Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, and the Kansas
Bureau of Identification, all of whom were unable to make
a reliable connection between the print and a pair of boots
that petitioner had voluntarily supplied, respondents
obtained a -positive identification- from one Louise Rob-
bins, an anthropologist in North Carolina who was alleg-
edly well known for her willingness to fabricate unreliable
expert testimony.  Her opinion was obtained during the
early stages of the investigation, which was being con-
ducted under the joint supervision and direction of the
sheriff and respondent Fitzsimmons, whose police officers
and assistant prosecutors were performing essentially the
same investigatory functions.
  Thereafter, having failed to obtain sufficient evidence to
support petitioner's (or anyone else's) arrest, respondents
convened a special grand jury for the sole purpose of
investigating the Nicarico case.  After an 8-month investi-
gation, during which the grand jury heard the testimony
of over 100 witnesses, including the bootprint experts, it
was still unable to return an indictment.  On January 27,
1984, respondent Fitzsimmons admitted in a public
statement that there was insufficient evidence to indict
anyone for the rape and murder of Jeanine Nicarico.
Although no additional evidence was obtained in the
interim, the indictment was returned in March, when
Fitzsimmons held the defamatory press conference so
shortly before the primary election.  Petitioner was then
arrested, and because he was unable to meet the bond
(set at $3 million), he was held in jail.
  Petitioner's trial began 10 months later, in January
1985.  The principal evidence against him was provided
by Robbins, the North Carolina anthropologist.  Because
the jury was unable to reach a verdict on the charges
against petitioner, the trial judge declared a mistrial.
Petitioner remained in prison for two more years, during
which a third party confessed to the crime and the
prosecutors prepared for his retrial.  After Robbins died,
however, all charges against him were dropped.  He was
released, and filed this action.

                                II
  We are not concerned with petitioner's actions against
the police officers (who have asserted the defense of
qualified immunity), against the expert witnesses (whose
trial testimony was granted absolute immunity by the
District Court, App. 53-57), and against DuPage County
(whose motion to dismiss on other grounds was granted
in part, id., at 57-61).  At issue here is only the action
against the prosecutors, who moved to dismiss based on
their claim to absolute immunity.  The District Court held
that respondents were entitled to absolute immunity for
all claims except the claim against Fitzsimmons based on
his press conference.  Id., at 53.  With respect to the
claim based on the alleged fabrication of evidence, the
District Court framed the question as whether the effort
-to obtain definitive boot evidence linking [petitioner to
the crime] was in the nature of acquisition of evidence or
in the nature of evaluation of evidence for the purpose of
initiating the criminal process.-  Id., at 45.  The Court
concluded that it -appears- that it was more evaluative
than acquisitive.
  Both petitioner and Fitzsimmons appealed, and a
divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the prosecutors had absolute immunity
on both claims.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 919 F. 2d 1230
(1990).  In the Court of Appeals' view, -damages remedies
are unnecessary,- id., at 1240, when -[c]ourts can curtail
the costs of prosecutorial blunders . . . by cutting short
the prosecution or mitigating its effects,- id., at 1241.
Thus, when -out-of-court acts cause injury only to the
extent a case proceeds- in court, id., at 1242, the prosecu-
tor is entitled to absolute immunity and -the defendant
must look to the court in which the case pends to protect
his interests,- id., at 1241.  By contrast, if -a constitu-
tional wrong is complete before the case begins,- the
prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity.  Id., at
1241-1242.  Applying this unprecedented theory to peti-
tioner's allegations, the Court of Appeals concluded that
neither the press conference nor the fabricated evidence
caused any constitutional injury independent of the
indictment and trial.  Id., at 1243, 1244.
  Judge Fairchild dissented in part.  He agreed with the
District Court that Fitzsimmons was entitled only to
qualified immunity for his press statements.  He noted
that the majority had failed to examine the particular
function that Fitzsimmons was performing, and concluded
that conducting a press conference was not among -the
functions that entitle judges and prosecutors in the
judicial branch to absolute immunity.-  Id., at 1246
(opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Responding directly to the majority's reasoning, he wrote:
       -It is true that procedures afforded in our system
of justice give a defendant a good chance to avoid
such results of prejudicial publicity as excessive bail,
difficulty or inability of selecting an impartial jury,
and the like.  These procedures reduce the cost of
impropriety by a prosecutor, but I do not find that the
courts have recognized their availability as a sufficient
reason for conferring immunity.-  Ibid.
  We granted Buckley's petition for certiorari, vacated the
judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings
in light of our intervening decision in Burns v. Reed, 500
U. S. ___ (1991).  502 U. S. ___ (1991).  On remand, the
same panel, again divided, reaffirmed its initial decision,
with one modification not relevant here.  952 F. 2d 965
(CA7 1992) (per curiam).  The Court of Appeals held that
-[n]othing in Burns undermine[d]- its initial holding that
prosecutors are absolutely immune for -normal preparatory
steps-; unlike the activities at issue in Burns, -[t]alking
with (willing) experts is trial preparation.-  952 F. 2d, at
966-967.  In similar fashion, the court adhered to its
conclusion that Fitzsimmons was entitled to absolute
immunity for conducting the press conference.  The court
recognized that the press conference bore some similarities
to the conduct in Burns (advising the police as to the
propriety of an arrest).  It did not take place in court, and
it was not part of the prosecutor's trial preparation.  952
F. 2d, at 967.  The difference, according to the court, is
that -[a]n arrest causes injury whether or not a prosecu-
tion ensues,- whereas the only constitutional injury caused
by the press conference depends on judicial action.  Ibid.
  Judge Fairchild again dissented.  He adhered to his
earlier conclusion that Fitzsimmons was entitled to only
qualified immunity for the press conference, but he was
also persuaded that Burns had drawn a line between
-`conduct closely related to the judicial process'- and
conduct in the role of -`administrator or investigative
officer.'-  He agreed that trial preparation falls on the
absolute immunity side of that line, but felt otherwise
about the search for favorable evidence that might link
the bootprint to petitioner during -a year long pre-arrest
and pre-indictment investigation- aggressively supervised
by Fitzsimmons.  Id., at 969 (opinion dissenting in part).
  We granted certiorari for a second time, limited to
issues relating to prosecutorial immunity.  506 U. S. ___
(1992).  We now reverse.

                                III
  The principles applied to determine the scope of immu-
nity for state officials sued under Rev. Stat. 1979, as
amended, 42 U. S. C. 1983 are by now familiar.  Section
1983 on its face admits of no defense of official immunity.
It subjects to liability -[e]very person- who, acting under
color of state law, commits the prohibited acts.  In Tenney
v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 376 (1951), however, we held
that Congress did not intend 1983 to abrogate immuni-
ties -well grounded in history and reason.-  Certain
immunities were so well established in 1871, when 1983
was enacted, that -we presume that Congress would have
specifically so provided had it wished to abolish- them.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554-555 (1967).  See also
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U. S. 247, 258 (1981).
Although we have found immunities in 1983 that do not
appear on the face of the statute, -[w]e do not have a
license to establish immunities from 1983 actions in the
interests of what we judge to be sound public policy.-
Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S. 914, 922-923 (1984).  -[O]ur
role is to interpret the intent of Congress in enacting
1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice.-  Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 342 (1986).
  Since Tenney, we have recognized two kinds of immuni-
ties under 1983.  Most public officials are entitled only
to qualified immunity.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S.
800, 807 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 508
(1978).  Under this form of immunity, government officials
are not subject to damages liability for the performance
of their discretionary functions when -their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.-
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 818.  In most cases,
qualified immunity is sufficient to -protect officials who
are required to exercise their discretion and the related
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of
official authority.-  Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S., at 506.
  We have recognized, however, that some officials per-
form -special functions- which, because of their similarity
to functions that would have been immune when Congress
enacted 1983, deserve absolute protection from damages
liability.  Id., at 508.  -[T]he official seeking absolute
immunity bears the burden of showing that such immu-
nity is justified for the function in question.-  Burns v.
Reed, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6); Antoine v. Byers
& Anderson, Inc., 508 U. S. ___, ___, and n. 4 (1993) (slip
op., at 3, and n. 4).  Even when we can identify a com-
mon-law tradition of absolute immunity for a given
function, we have considered -whether 1983's history or
purposes nonetheless counsel against recognizing the same
immunity in 1983 actions.-  Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S.,
at 920.  Not surprisingly, we have been -quite sparing-
in recognizing absolute immunity for state actors in this
context.  Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 224 (1988).
  In determining whether particular actions of government
officials fit within a common-law tradition of absolute
immunity, or only the more general standard of qualified
immunity, we have applied a -functional approach,- see,
e.g., Burns, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6), which looks
to -the nature of the function performed, not the identity
of the actor who performed it.-  Forrester v. White, 484
U. S., at 229.  We have twice applied this approach in
determining whether the functions of contemporary
prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity.
  In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976), we held
that a state prosecutor had absolute immunity for the
initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, including
presentation of the state's case at trial.  Noting that our
earlier cases had been -predicated upon a considered
inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the
relevant official at common law and the interests behind
it-, id., at 421, we focused on the functions of the prose-
cutor that had most often invited common law tort
actions.  We concluded that the common-law rule of
immunity for prosecutors was -well settled- and that -the
same considerations of public policy that underlie the
common-law rule likewise countenance absolute immunity
under 1983.-  Id., at 424.  Those considerations sup-
ported a rule of absolute immunity for conduct of prosecu-
tors that was -intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process.-  Id., at 430.  In concluding
that -in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit
for damages under 1983,- we did not attempt to describe
the line between a prosecutor's acts in preparing for those
functions, some of which would be absolutely immune, and
his acts of investigation or -administration,- which would
not.  Id., at 431, and n. 33.
  We applied the Imbler analysis two Terms ago in Burns
v. Reed, 500 U. S. ___ (1991).  There the 1983 suit
challenged two acts by a prosecutor: (1) giving legal advice
to the police on the propriety of hypnotizing a suspect and
on whether probable cause existed to arrest that suspect,
and (2) participating in a probable-cause hearing.  We
held that only the latter was entitled to absolute immu-
nity.  Immunity for that action under 1983 accorded with
the common-law absolute immunity of prosecutors and
other attorneys for eliciting false or defamatory testimony
from witnesses or for making false or defamatory state-
ments during, and related to, judicial proceedings.  Id., at
___-___ (slip op., at 9-10); id., at ___ (slip op., at 6)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting
in part).  Under that analysis, appearing before a judge
and presenting evidence in support of a motion for a
search warrant involved the prosecutor's -`role as advocate
for the State.'-  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10), quoting
Imbler, 424 U. S., at 431, n. 33.  Because issuance of a
search warrant is a judicial act, appearance at the proba-
ble-cause hearing was -`intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process,'- Burns, 500 U. S.,
at ___ (slip op., at 11), quoting Imbler, 424 U. S., at 430.
  We further decided, however, that prosecutors are not
entitled to absolute immunity for their actions in giving
legal advice to the police.  We were unable to identify any
historical or common-law support for absolute immunity
in the performance of this function.  500 U. S., at ___-___
(slip op., at 12-13).  We also noted that any threat to the
judicial process from -the harassment and intimidation
associated with litigation- based on advice to the police
was insufficient to overcome the -[a]bsen[ce] [of] a tradi-
tion of immunity comparable to the common-law immunity
from malicious prosecution, which formed the basis for the
decision in Imbler.-  Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13-14).  And
though we noted that several checks other than civil
litigation prevent prosecutorial abuses in advising the
police, -one of the most important checks, the judicial
process,- will not be effective in all cases, especially when
in the end the suspect is not prosecuted.  Id., at ___-___
(slip op., at 15-16).  In sum, we held that providing legal
advice to the police was not a function -closely associated
with the judicial process.-  Id., at ___ (slip op. at 15).

                                IV
  In this case the Court of Appeals held that respondents
are entitled to absolute immunity because the injuries
suffered by petitioner occurred during criminal proceed-
ings.  That holding is contrary to the approach we have
consistently followed since Imbler.  As we have noted, the
Imbler approach focuses on the conduct for which immu-
nity is claimed, not on the harm that the conduct may
have caused or the question whether it was lawful.  The
location of the injury may be relevant to the question
whether a complaint has adequately alleged a cause of
action for damages (a question that this case does not
present, see supra, at 1).  It is irrelevant, however, to the
question whether the conduct of a prosecutor is protected
by absolute immunity.  Accordingly, although the Court
of Appeals' reasoning may be relevant to the proper
resolution of issues that are not before us, it does not
provide an acceptable basis for concluding that either the
preindictment fabrication of evidence or the postindictment
press conference was a function protected by absolute
immunity.  We therefore turn to consider each of respond-
ents' claims of absolute immunity.

                                 A
  We first address petitioner's argument that the prosecu-
tors are not entitled to absolute immunity for the claim
that they conspired to manufacture false evidence that
would link his boot with the bootprint the murderer left
on the front door.  To obtain this false evidence, petitioner
submits, the prosecutors shopped for experts until they
found one who would provide the opinion they sought.
App. 7-9.  At the time of this witness shopping the
assistant prosecutors were working hand in hand with the
sheriff's detectives under the joint supervision of the
sheriff and state's attorney Fitzsimmons.
  Petitioner argues that Imbler's protection for a prosecu-
tor's conduct -in initiating a prosecution and in presenting
the State's case,- 424 U. S., at 431, extends only to the
act of initiation itself and to conduct occurring in the
courtroom.  This extreme position is plainly foreclosed by
our opinion in Imbler itself.  We expressly stated that -the
duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the
State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a
prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom,- and
are nonetheless entitled to absolute immunity.  Id., at
431, n. 33.  We noted in particular that an out-of-court
-effort to control the presentation of [a] witness' testi-
mony- was entitled to absolute immunity because it was
-fairly within [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate.-
Id., at 430, n. 32.  To be sure, Burns made explicit the
point we had reserved in Imbler, 424 U. S., at 430-431,
and n. 33: A prosecutor's administrative duties and those
investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate's
preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for
judicial proceedings are not entitled to absolute immunity.
See Burns, 500 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15).  We have
not retreated, however, from the principle that acts
undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation
of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the
course of his role as an advocate for the State, are
entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.  Those
acts must include the professional evaluation of the
evidence assembled by the police and appropriate prepara-
tion for its presentation at trial or before a grand jury
after a decision to seek an indictment has been made.
  On the other hand, as the function test of Imbler
recognizes, the actions of a prosecutor are not absolutely
immune merely because they are performed by a prosecu-
tor.  Qualified immunity -`represents the norm'- for
executive officers, Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S., at 340,
quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 807, so when
a prosecutor -functions as an administrator rather than
as an officer of the court- he is entitled only to qualified
immunity.  Imbler, 424 U. S., at 431, n. 33.  There is a
difference between the advocate's role in evaluating
evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for
trial, on the one hand, and the detective's role in search-
ing for the clues and corroboration that might give him
probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested,
on the other hand.  When a prosecutor performs the
investigative functions normally performed by a detective
or police officer, it is -neither appropriate nor justifiable
that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one
and not the other.-  Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F. 2d 602,
608 (CA7 1973) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 415 U. S. 917 (1974).  Thus, if a prosecutor plans
and executes a raid on a suspected weapons cache, he
-has no greater claim to complete immunity than activities
of police officers allegedly acting under his direction.-  484
F. 2d, at 608-609.
  The question, then, is whether the prosecutors have
carried their burden of establishing that they were func-
tioning as -advocates- when they were endeavoring to
determine whether the bootprint at the scene of the crime
had been made by petitioner's foot.  A careful examination
of the allegations concerning the conduct of the prosecu-
tors during the period before they convened a special
grand jury to investigate the crime provides the answer.
See supra, at 3, n. 1. The prosecutors do not contend that
they had probable cause to arrest petitioner or to initiate
judicial proceedings during that period.  Their mission at
that time was entirely investigative in character.  A
prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be,
an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone
arrested.
  It was well after the alleged fabrication of false evidence
concerning the bootprint that a special grand jury was
impaneled.  And when it finally was convened, its immedi-
ate purpose was to conduct a more thorough investigation
of the crime-not to return an indictment against a
suspect whom there was already probable cause to arrest.
Buckley was not arrested, in fact, until 10 months after
the grand jury had been convened and had finally indicted
him.  Under these circumstances, the prosecutors' conduct
occurred well before they could properly claim to be acting
as advocates.  Respondents have not cited any authority
that supports an argument that a prosecutor's fabrication
of false evidence during the preliminary investigation of
an unsolved crime was immune from liability at common
law, either in 1871 or at any date before the enactment
of 1983.  It therefore remains protected only by qualified
immunity.
  After Burns, it would be anomalous, to say the least,
to grant prosecutors only qualified immunity when offering
legal advice to police about an unarrested suspect, but
then to endow them with absolute immunity when con-
ducting investigative work themselves in order to decide
whether a suspect may be arrested.  That the prosecu-
tors later called a grand jury to consider the evidence this
work produced does not retroactively transform that work
from the administrative into the prosecutorial.  A prose-
cutor may not shield his investigative work with the aegis
of absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is
eventually arrested, indicted, and tried, that work may be
retrospectively described as -preparation- for a possible
trial; every prosecutor might then shield himself from
liability for any constitutional wrong against innocent
citizens by ensuring that they go to trial.  When the
functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same, as
they were here, the immunity that protects them is also
the same.

                                 B
  We next consider petitioner's claims regarding Fitz-
simmons' statements to the press.  Petitioner alleged that,
during the prosecutor's public announcement of the
indictment, Fitzsimmons made false assertions that
numerous pieces of evidence, including the bootprint
evidence, tied Buckley to a burglary ring that committed
the Nicarico murder.  App. 12.  Petitioner also alleged
that Fitzsimmons released mug shots of him to the media,
-which were prominently and repeatedly displayed on
television and in the newspapers.-  Ibid.  Petitioner's legal
theory is that -[t]hese false and prejudicial statements
inflamed the populace of DuPage County against- him,
ibid.; see also id., at 14, thereby defaming him, resulting
in deprivation of his right to a fair trial, and causing the
jury to deadlock rather than acquit, id., at 19.
  Fitzsimmons' statements to the media are not entitled
to absolute immunity.  Fitzsimmons does not suggest that
in 1871 there existed a common-law immunity for a
prosecutor's, or attorney's, out-of-court statement to the
press.  The Court of Appeals agreed that no such histori-
cal precedent exists.  952 F. 2d, at 967.  Indeed, while
prosecutors, like all attorneys, were entitled to absolute
immunity from defamation liability for statements made
during the course of judicial proceedings and relevant to
them, see Burns, 500 U. S., at ___-___ (slip op., at 9-10);
Imbler, 424 U. S., at 426, n. 23; id., at 439 (White, J.,
concurring in judgment), most statements made out-of-
court received only good-faith immunity.  The common-law
rule was that -[t]he speech of a counsel is privileged by
the occasion on which it is spoken . . . .-  Flint v. Pike,
4 Barn. & Cress. 473, 478, 107 Eng. Rep. 1136, 1138
(K. B. 1825) (Bayley, J.).
  The functional approach of Imbler, which conforms to
the common-law theory, leads us to the same conclusion.
Comments to the media have no functional tie to the
judicial process just because they are made by a prosecu-
tor.  At the press conference, Fitzsimmons did not act in
-`his role as advocate for the State,'- Burns v. Reed,
supra, at ___ (slip op., at 10), quoting Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U. S., at 431, n. 33.  The conduct of a press confer-
ence does not involve the initiation of a prosecution, the
presentation of the state's case in court, or actions prepa-
ratory for these functions.  Statements to the press may
be an integral part of a prosecutor's job, see National
District Attorneys Assn., National Prosecution Standards
107, 110 (2d ed. 1991), and they may serve a vital public
function.  But in these respects a prosecutor is in no
different position than other executive officials who deal
with the press, and, as noted above, supra, at 8-9, 18,
qualified immunity is the norm for them.
  Fitzsimmons argues nonetheless that policy consider-
ations support extending absolute immunity to press
statements.  Brief for Respondents 30-33.  There are two
responses to his submissions.  First, -[w]e do not have a
license to establish immunities from 1983 actions in the
interests of what we judge to be sound public policy.-
Tower v. Glover, 467 U. S., at 922-923.  When, as here,
the prosecutorial function is not within the advocate's role
and there is no historical tradition of immunity on which
we can draw, our inquiry is at an end.  Second, -[t]he
presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immu-
nity is sufficient to protect government officials in the
exercise of their duties.-  Burns v. Reed, 500 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 6).  Even if policy considerations allowed us
to carve out new absolute immunities to liability for
constitutional wrongs under 1983, we see little reason
to suppose that qualified immunity would provide ade-
quate protection to prosecutors in their provision of legal
advice to the police, see id., at ___-___ (slip op., at 14-15),
yet would fail to provide sufficient protection in the
present context.
                                 V
  In his complaint, petitioner also charged that the
prosecutors violated his rights under the Due Process
Clause through extraction of statements implicating him
by coercing two witnesses and paying them money.  App.
9-11, 19.  The precise contours of these claims are
unclear, and they were not addressed below; we leave
them to be passed on in the first instance by the Court
of Appeals on remand.
  As we have stated, supra, at 1, 4-5, and n. 2, petitioner
does not challenge many aspects of the Court of Appeals'
decision, and we have not reviewed them; they remain
undisturbed by this opinion.  As to the two challenged
rulings on absolute immunity, however, the judgment of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                It is so ordered.